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ABSTRACT
We present a normative decision model for hierarchical organiza-
tions whose levels operate at different tempos. We describe the
mathematical methodology whereby each level forms internal models
of the detailed state process, corresponding to its tempo of
operation. Based on these models, we describe a rational aggregate
strategy for the hierarchical organization.
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1. Introduction
In many of the presentations included in the proceedings of this
MIT-ONR C3 workshop, a distinction has been made between the physical
(electronic, human) system used to gather and distribute information
and commands, (the C3 I system) and the processing of this information
to select appropriate courses of action (the C2 process). It is the
contention of many researchers that any evaluation of a C3I system is
influenced by the C2 process which it supports. This, in turn, requires
proper understanding of how decisions are made in the complex environment
in which C3 systems operate.
One of the most interesting aspects of the C decision processes
in the C3 environment is that decisions must take into account the
presence of other decision makes in the environment. Furthermore,
these decision makes are often arranged in a hierarchical fashion,
distributed throughout the environment, as illustrated in figure 1.
Although figure 1 represents a simplistic view of a C organization,
it serves to highlight several important points: First, the presence of
a hierarchical structure indicates that different perspectives of the
same environment are needed at each decision level. Second, the amount
of interaction between different nodes at the same level is often small,
since they are typically interacting with different parts of the
environment.
In this paper, we study the problem of developing a normative,
rational model of a decision-maker operating as part of the C2 process
in the C3 environment. This model reflects several important issues: the
presence of many decision makes in a system, the hierarchical nature of
the decision structure, and the existence of different perspectives of
the environment at different decision levels. The model is developed
as a precise set of mathematical axioms. The consequences of these
axioms are then explored in the context of some simple dynamic decision
problems.
The paper is divided into two main parts. The first part discusses
in some detail the problem of developing mutually consistent mathematical
models which represent perceptions of the environment at different levels
of aggregation. The basic concept used in this part is that of tempo,
or time scale, of operation. Based on an underlying accurate global
description, consistent aggregate models are given, which represent the
evolution of the system at a specific tempo of operation. The accuracy
of these models is characterized, and conditions are given which specify
when such models can be obtained. This part of the paper is a brief
summary of the results of [1], consisting of joint work with Mr. Marcel
Coderch, Prof. A. Willsky and Prof. S. Sastry of MIT/LIDS.
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The second part of the paper proposes a normative model for each
decision maker in the C3 environment which uses the aggregate models
obtained in the first part of the paper. The concept of aggregate
rationality is proposed as a desirable solution to the overall decision
problem, using concepts from game theory and hierarchical structures.
The development of consistent aggregate models which are accurate
at a specific time scale is a problem which has received considerable
attention in recent years. The works of Kokotovic et.al. [2],
Korolyuk [3], Papanicolaou [4], and other are typical of the results
obtained. Most of these authors developed approximations which were
only valid at one specific time scale. An extension of this work
to a hierarchy of models at many time scales was developed in [1].
The work on aggregation which we report here is a summary of our
results in [l].
Dynamical decision problems with different cost criteria and a
hierarchical structure have been studied extensively in the literature,
under the name of Stackelberg games. The first authors to study these
class of decision problems were Chan and Cruz t5]. Their work was
extended by many authors, [6], [7]. In particular, Basar and his co-
workers [8]-[9] have studied the solution of Stackelberg decision
problems using incentive strategies to achieve goal coordination
between different decision levels.
The results in this paper combine the concepts of aggregate modeling
and hierarchical decision theory to produce a mathematical theory of
rational behavior which captures some important features of realistic
decision situations. First of all, decision makers involved at the higher
(more "global") levels of the decision-hierarchy will use coarser,
aggregate models, and operate at a slower tempo than their low-level
counterparts. Their decisions are interpreted as global directives, to
be amplified and interpreted by their subordinates. This model of
rational behavior is different from the classical game-theoretic models
of hierarchical decision structures, where the higher levels are
required to have more detailed information about the system than their
lower level counterparts.
The second important aspect of this theory is that it proposes an
analytical way for developing internal models (for each decision maker)
at a specified tempo of operations, starting from a microscopic reality.
This may not seem as an important advantage in real-life, on-line analysis
of events, because a microscopic model of reality is not readily available.
However, this result is useful for off-line, analytical studies of the
value of C3 I equipment supporting a set of decision makers, where the
scenarios are pre-specified and controlled.
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Finally, it should be stressed that all of the results presented
in this paper are strictly part of an analytical methodology, which
needs to be tested to decide its actual value in the study of C3 systems.
The concept of aggregate rationality is speculative, and needs to be
investigated further. In addition, the methodology has been developed
to the level where simple models can be studied. It remain to be seen
whether additional extensions will make it sufficiently general to have
practical significance.
2. Hierarchical Aggregation of Linear Systems
This section is a brief overview of the results in [1]. For a
complete proof of the main theorem, as well as precise mathematical
statements, the reader is referred to 1l].
We begin by postulating a dynamic model which describes the
entire evolution of the system when no decisions are applied. We
assume that the system state, of finite dimension, evolves according
to a differential equation of the form
dx
dx A(e)x (2.1)dt
where x represents the state vector, and A(e) is a matrix which depends
on a small parameter e, as
A(e) = I A.e (2.2)
i=O
The presence of the parameter e is used to model the different
tempos at which events occur in the evolution of the system. For ins-
tance, e reflects the strength of the coupling between events occurring
distant corners of the environment, or the ratio between the average
delay for decisions at a high level in a hierarchy, and the average
delay for decisions at a lower level. The formulation of a system
model with a properly identified structure of the form (2.1) and (2.2)
is a difficult engineering task which we do not address here. We
assume that the model (2.1) is given, and that 6 has been chosen ap-
propriately on physical grounds.
Based on the model of equation (2.1), there are two important
questions to answer: Given a specified tempo of operation (time-scale),
does there exist a simple aggregate model of the system which accurately
reflects the evolution of the model in equation 2.1? If so, what is
that model? The purpose of this section is to make these questions
mathematically precise, and to provide an answer in some cases.
We begin with some mathematical preliminaries. The solution of
equation 2.1, considered as a time function on the semi-infinite
interval [0, -), can be written as
e A(6)t
x (t) = e x) te2o0,) (2.3)
for arbitrary initial conditions xO.
An aggregation y(t) of the trajectory x(t) is a mapping
G: X Y
where X is the state space of x(t), and Y + X is a proper subspace
of X. Usually, Y is defined through an equivalence relationship
which identifies equivalent states in X.
Our objective in this section is to establish conditions on
the system 2.1 such that, when the system is viewed at a specific tempo
or time scale T = t/f(e), the evolution of the system state can be
approximated by an aggregate model, operating at the T time scale.
Mathematically, we want to define an aggregate trajectory
y (T), with its own generating model
d (T) = A(')(e) yC(T) (2.4)
such that
lim sup Ily (T)-G(x (t/f(e)))[I=O (2.5)
e.0 0<T<~ '
Equation 2.5 demands that the aggregation must provide an accurate
representation of the time trajectory, depending on the physical
parameter 6.
The primary result in [1] can be stated as follows:
Let AO(6), for e in [0,e0 1, be a matrix-valued function, with
constant rank d for O<e<e . Assume furthermore that A (e) has semi-
simple null structure (a full complement of zero eigenvector for all 6).
Construct the sequence of matrices
(0)
A )= A 0
(i)
A t




A(2) = PP (A-A A+ A )P P
where A0 = any pseudo-inverse of AO.
(i)
The exact construction of the rest of the sequence A , i>2
is described in [1] and [10]. For the purposes of the theorem
statement, we need to define one more term. A matrix A is semistable
if and only if
sup IleAt l < X
t
Theorem [1]: Let A (e) be a matrix with semisimple null structure.
If A (0),...,A (m) are semistable matrices with
E rank A = d, then
i=O
lim sup IeA()t_ (e,t) II =
e6Q t>O
where
m A (k) kt
(e,t) =) I e
k--0
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Furthermore, for any specific time scale T= t/ k . let
k-l
Xk = E Pi. Then,
i=O
(k) t
lir sup I i Ct/ek) - 7keA xo 1
Ce.O O<t<T
Also, the only non-trivial time scales are integer powers of e
less than or equal to m.
The last formula in the theorem defines our aggregate process.
Define the equivalence relation xl ~ x2 if and only if
ikXl = ikx2 . Let Y=X/,. be the factor space of equivalence classes
of X under . Then, there is an aggregate model for the evolution of
y(T), given by the restriction of the flow
A (k)t
x(T) = rke xO
to the subspace Range Tk. The exact construction of this aggregate
model is a question of simple algebra, described in [1].
Although the conditions of semistability required for the existence
of accurate aggregate models at specific tempos of operation appear
stringent, there are numerous examples of systems which satisfy these
conditions. An important class of systems is that of positive systems,
where the trajectory of x(t) is lies in the positive orthant. An
example of such a system is the evolution of the probabilities of a
stochastic finite state Markov process. Further development of these
results will appear in a forthcoming paper.
There are many issues concerning aggregate models which have not
been addressed in this section. We have analyzed only the free, un-
controlled evolution of the system 2.1. The presence of control actions
has not been modeled; these actions can change the time structure of the
system. An example of such a change in structure consists of a supreme
commander taking direct control of a low-level operation. In this case,
new informational links, much faster than the standard channels, have to
be set up in order to provide relevant information to the supreme level,
about the details of the operation. What we have developed in this
section is the concept that, if there are natural tempos of operation
for different decision nodes monitoring a specific environment,
simplified aggregate models can be obtained which approximate the
system at those tempos of operation. The next section will expand
upon these ideas by studying the problem of decision making in
such an environment.
3. Games with Uncertain Models
Informally, game theory can be viewed as the scientific study of
decision making in situations with possible conflicts of interest.
As discussed in standard textbooks (e.g. t11l), a game can be analyzed
in terms of a three components (U,J,S), as follows:
The set U is the set of all possible decision strategies which can be
used by all decision-makers (players) in a game. Typically, U can be
decomposed in product form as
U=U x U 2 x...x U (3.1)
where m is the number of players in the game, indicating that the
choice of strategy is unconstrained by other player's strategies.
The element J, the performance function, is an R - valued real
function, which assigns a set of utilities to each player for each
choice of admissible strategy u e U. Mathematically,
J: U + Rm
The third element S is the controversial part of game theory.
The set S is called a solution concept, or a selection rule, and its
purpose is to identify sets of strategies, based on the performance
function, which can be accepted as rational outcomes for the play of
the game. Hence, we specify S as a subset of U completely described
by a condition in terms of J. That is,
S = {u* e U: C(J(u*)) is satisfied} (3.2)
As an example of a typical selection rule, consider the problem
of minimizing a specific cost functional, H(u). The condition becomes







Once the parameters of the game are established, and become known
to all players, each player is in an individual position to compute all
elements of the set S. Typically, S will consist of a single element,
thereby defining uniquely the rational course of play for the game.
Each player is assumed to follow his rational course of action, as
established by the selection rule S.
There are several implicit assumptions which need to be considered
carefully when one studies the concept of rational solutions of games,
as described above. First of all, the assumption is made that all
players have access to the complete detailed model (U,J,S), so that each
player can individually compute the rational strategy set S.
Second, the situations where S has many elements have to be resolved
by an additional, unspecified mechanism to identify a single rational
play of the game.
In terms of the discussion on aggregate models specified in
Section 2, the classical game assumptions would require each level to
have a complete microscopic model of the situation, in order to be
able to evaluate accurately all of the possible payoffs corres~ponding
to individual plays of the game. This contradicts the philosophy of
using simpler models, valid at specific tempos of operation, which was
proposed in section 2. In the rest of this section, we propose a new
normative model for determining rational solutions to game problems,
which we denote as L, aggregate rationality.
Our first assumption is that each decision maker in the game has
an intrinsic tempo of operation, which cannot be changed by the
strategies of other decision makers. Basically, this implies that the
aggregate, internal models used for decision purposes will not change
dramatically with the choices of strategies. We will make this
concept mathematically precise in this section.
For the present, we will restrict ourselves to discussing games
with a strict hierarchical structure. That is, decision makers are
arranged in a structure, as in Figure 2. To each level in the hierarchy,
we assign tempo of operation, together with an internal model, which
describes the evolution of the system state at that tempo. In addition,
we define a "meta-game" at that tempo which involves an aggregate model
of all other decision levels' objectives and actions. Based on this
perceived game, each level is able to compute its rational aggregate
strategy.
Formally, assume that the state of the system evolves according to
the differential equation
m
d = A(e)x(t) + Bi(6)ui (t) (3.3)
i-l
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where m is the number of levels present in the hierarchical structure.
We assume that A(e) can be factored into a form which explicitly displays
a multiple time scale structure, as
All(e) ..... Alm (e)
A(e) = diag .... ,I} * At(e) A (6e)
where the block matrices A. (e) are also analytically dependent on
ly




Notice that this partition creates a causal structure in terms of
aggregate models. At the fastest time scale, xl(t) describes the
evolution of the relevant variables, influenced by the levels set by
the slower states x2(t),....,x (t). At the next time scale, T=Et,
the fast transients of xl(t) have died out, leading to a reducedmodel,
whose principal evolution is described in terms of x2(t).
The control laws u1(t), u2(t),...,ur(t) are assumed to vary
at the natural time scale of the decision level, or slower. Hence,
u2(t) au2 (et)'
2 * (3.6)
u3 (t ) = u3 (e2 t)
uk (t) = uk( t)
The strategies are selected in a hierarchical order, starting from
the slowest, or most aggregate, level. At the fastest, most detailed
level, all of the higher levels have announced their strategy, so that
the choice of strategy at this level is reduced to solving for a single
decision maker's strategy. This strategy is parametrized by the higher
level's decisions, which vary in a slower time scale.
Rational play in the game is determined as follows: At the most
detailed level, with a tempo Tof order t, the performance criteria is
given as
00
J = (x' Q x + u R. u. i)dt (37)
~~~~--------------·---------·---------------------0-
where the evolution of the vector process x is governed by equation
(3.3). Since level 1 is the lowest level, we assume that, from the
hierarchical structure of the game, that the strategies from players
2 through m are known, so that player 1 can determine his optimal
strategy in a straightforward optimal control problem.
For level 2, the natural time scale is T = t/e. At thistime
scale, the evolutions at the tempo T=t have achieved their steady
state. That is,
l =O= All(e)x +...+Al(e)x + B u. (ui t)1 1 1 lm m
i=2
+ Blul (et) (3.8)
where we have assumed that
f ss
ul(t) = u(t)  t  + t)(3.9)
so that the local decisions of level 1 can be divided into short term
and long term strategies.
Hence, the decision problem at level 2 can be described in terms
of an aggregate game. The cost function, in the T =t/e scale, is
m 2
2 2 j i 3 } (3.10) j=
where the evolution of x1 is assumed to have reached steady state, so
that x1 is no longer a dynamic variable. In addition, in order to
completely define a well-posed decision problem for player 2, we must
specify an internal model of player l's long-term strategy to be used
by player 2. We use our aggregation philosophy, to specify a perceived
decision model for level 1.
In level 2's tempo, level l's decision problem becomes
inimize' SS (3.11)
Minimize J!+ U- RI U 1 + u'R'u.)dT (3.11)0 ( j=2 ] ]
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subject to the same dynamic model used at level 2. Note that this
perceived problem neglects the faster evolution terms present in
level l's original cost. Hence, it is only the perceived decision
problem, at level 2's tempo, rather than the actual decision problem.
This perception is obtained by using our philosophy of defining
aggregate models based on tempo.
Following this structure, we endow level i with its own cost
function, of the form
1 i
Sei - 0 jl Jco
(3.12)
subject to
=.. *.x =0 (3.13)
and define perceived decision problems at this tempo, consistent
with the original decision problem specified at faster tempos.
We call the set of strategies which are optimal under this decision
structures the aggregate rational strategies. In the next section, we
illustrate the implications of this concept in the context of a simple
example.
4. Example
For the sake of simplicity, we consider an example with two levels
of decision making. Furthermore, to illustrate the different time
scales of the system, we assume that one component of the state vector
operates in discrete time, while the other evolves continuously.
Assume that the system state is described by the evolution equation
Xt+l = xt + 2y t + ut - v (4.1)
dy = Yt - x + ut +t (4.2)dt t t
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The system has two natural time scales of evolution: T-= t,
corresponding to the evolution of the y process, and t, for the discrete
part. We assume that there are two decision levels, with vt
corresponding to the fast level, and ut to the slower level. The
performance measure associated with vt is
00
('2 2 2
2 j (x2 + YT + 2v)dT (43)
while the performance measure associated with ut is
J (x2 +u + v) (4.4)t t t
It is assumed that xt, u t are constant on ft,t+l)
We begin with the problem seen by u . At the t time scale,
vy=O. Hence
s s
y= x - u - v(45)
t t t t
Hence, the dynamical system seen by ut is
x =3xt -3v t - (4.6)t+1 t t t
Furthermore, his perception of J2 is
jp = I 2 + (xt-u -Vt) + 2vt2 (4.7)
2 t-0 t tt t
In this dynamical problem, player U is seen as a leader in a hierarchical
problem. In most cases, he can use a memory-dependent strategy which
achieves the team-optimal performance, by using goal coordination. We
compute such a strategy in the following discussion.
Assume that u and v were a team, with common goal (4.4). Then,
the optimal strategies would be
U* 3- + 3 x = a*xt (4.8)
t 30 3 t t
~~~~~ -------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~---------- -
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- + -.91 xt = b*x (4.9)t 10 t
x* 3x -u -t3v* = 3 (i- /1)x (4.10)
In order to achieve this optimal trajectory, level 2 can use
a goal-coordination memory strategy, of the form
Ut = a*xt + g(xt-(3-a*-3b*)xt_1 ) (4.11)
The exact value of g depends on the cost criterion used at level 1.
According to (4.7), when (4.11) is used as a strategy, the resulting
optimization problem for v is
min J 2 = 7 xt +(xt-ut-v s ) + vt (4.12)
The exact value of g can thus be calculated as the value for which
b*xt is the optimal strategy which minimizes (4.12). We have not
taken the time to compute this value, because it involves tedious
algebraic manipulations better left to machines.
Once level 2's rational strategy (4.11) is decided, the next
step is to solve for the rational strategy of level 1. This involves
looking at the detailed performance index (4.3). Due to the consistency
between (4.3) and (4.7), the effect of u* is to force the slow part
of vt to match the optimal slow strategy (4.9). However,
%t = Vt + v(T) (4.13)
where
lim v (T) =O, T=t/e .
Note that the choice of v(T) is not constrained by the strategy
ut , because it is varying much faster than the tempo used for decisions
at the discrete time scale. The strategy v(T) can be determined from
the reduced problem on the T time scale.
5. Conclusion
The concept of aggregate rationality introduced in section 3 and
illustrated in section 4 provides an interesting decision model -for
hierarchical organizations. By prescribing a sequence of perceived
games, rational strategies can be defined at each level of aggregation.
Some of our preliminary investigations hint that the concept of ag-
gregate rationality is very robust; that is, there is little benefit
to be gained from using more detailed models for decision making.
We are in the process of developing a rigorous mathematical theory
which will expand on the concepts presented here. In particular,
there are several key questions which must be addressed, concerning
well-posedness of the solution problem, and canonical forms for the
decision models under study. These studies will be reported at
future C3 workshops.
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